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Background
• NASA Aviation Safety Program
• Emergency situations (e.g., runway incursion, 
airframe damage) may warrant unconventional usage 
of aircraft engines
• Overthrust (OT): Increase maximum thrust output 
• Faster response (FR): More responsive transient 
thrust response
• Development of risk-based control modes that 
enhance engine performance for emergency use
3
 Csank et al., “The Effect of Modified Control Limits on the Performance of a Generic Commercial Aircraft Engine,” 
47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, 2011.
 May et al., “Improving Engine Responsiveness during Approach through High Speed Idle Control,” 47th
AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, 2011.
 Liu et al., “Design and Demonstration of Emergency Control Modes for Enhanced Engine Performance,” 49th
AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2013
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Control Mode: Overthrust
• Control mode relaxes 
limits on temperature and 
rotational speeds
• Thrust available is 
increased 
• Maximum overthrust at 
any operating condition is 
defined by a 
predetermined disk/blade 
failure risk level
4
Liu et al., “Design and Demonstration of Emergency Control Modes for Enhanced Engine Performance,” 
49th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2013.
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Control Mode: Faster Response
• Control mode activation 
increases thrust 
responsiveness to throttle 
changes
• Modification to engine control 
system gains, schedules, etc.
• Risk of stall related to minimum 
stall margin attained during 
transient
• Reduction of minimum stall 
margin to consistent level
5
Liu et al., “Design and Demonstration of Emergency Control Modes for Enhanced Engine Performance,” 
49th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2013.
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Objectives
• Apply control modes to aircraft 
simulation
– Propulsion: Commercial Modular Aero-
Propulsion System Simulation 40k (C-
MAPSS40k), NASA Glenn
– Airframe: Transport Class Model (TCM), 
NASA Langley
– Piloted flight simulator: Modular Flight 
Deck (MFD), Precision Flight Controls, 
Inc.
• Evaluate effectiveness of control modes 
through simulations of emergency 
scenarios
• Runway incursions
– Computer simulation (i.e., autopilot)
• Flight control surface failure
– Autopilot and piloted evaluations
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Runway Incursion
7
• Aircraft stationary
• Throttles 0 to 90%
• Incursion detected
• Throttles 90% to 
100%
• Pull up to 15º pitch
• Aircraft clears 50 
feet above ground 
level (AGL)
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Runway Incursion
8
• Test cases:
– Baseline vs. enhanced 
performance
– New vs. end-of-life (EOL) 
engines
– Vary XP (point where 
incursion is detected)
• Metric: additional distance 
required to clear 50 feet 
AGL (XC-XP)
• Greater improvement with 
earlier detection (but also 
less useful)
• OT mode with EOL engines 
nearly recovers 
baseline/new performance
800
1300
1800
2300
2800
3300
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
X
C
-
X
P
,
 
f
t
VP, kts
Baseline, new
Baseline, EOL
Enhanced, new
Enhanced, EOL
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
www.nasa.gov
Flight Control Surface Failure
9
• Failure of all primary flight control surfaces (elevator, aileron, 
rudder)
• Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA): control system reconfigured 
to command engine power setting
Burcham et al., “Development and Flight Evaluation of an Emergency Digital Flight Control System Using 
Only Engine Thrust on an F-15 Airplane,” NASA Technical Paper, 1996.
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Control Surface Failure: Evaluations
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• Evaluations of longitudinal and lateral aircraft maneuverability with 
baseline and enhanced engines
• Tests conducted by autopilot (“unaware” of control surface failure) and 
human pilot
• Engine power settings are indirectly controlled through PCA control 
system
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Control Surface Failure
Longitudinal Maneuvers—Autopilot
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• Altitude profile of PCA with enhanced control modes nearly identical to that of 
nominal aircraft (fully functional flight controls)
• PCA with baseline engines results in instability
– Autopilot does not compensate for slow response of baseline engines (commands too 
aggressive)
– PCA control gains may not be optimal
• Performance-enhancing control modes provide protection against instabilities
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Control Surface Failure
Longitudinal Maneuvers—Piloted
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• Maneuver requirements relaxed for piloted evaluations
– Exact trajectory not required
– Just hit the altitude waypoints (e.g., 5000 feet, 6000 feet, 3000 feet)
• Pilot was aware of control surface failure, but unaware of engine control mode 
status
• Aircraft control with baseline engines more difficult, though the pilot was able to 
prevent instabilities for 1 of 3 baseline PCA runs
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Control Surface Failure
Lateral Maneuvers—Autopilot
13
• Roll response not ideal, but 
faster engines prevent 
instabilities
• Autopilot too aggressive in trying 
to maintain altitude during rolling 
maneuvers
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Control Surface Failure
Lateral Maneuvers—Piloted
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• Pilot had to hit heading 
waypoints (no trajectory 
requirement)
• No instabilities for baseline or 
enhanced engines
• Pilot tried to maintain altitude, 
but not at expense of stability
• Autopilot had tighter altitude 
control, but only successful with 
faster thrust response
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Summary & Conclusions
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• Control modes: engine performance enhancements 
based on failure risk elevation
• Control mode implementation on aircraft/propulsion 
simulation and flight simulator test bed
• Evaluated control modes using example flight 
emergency scenarios (runway incursion & flight control 
surface failure)
• Extra thrust reduces takeoff distance 
• Faster response protects against instabilities if aircraft 
must be maneuvered with engines only
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Overthrust: Implementation
• Reduced-order risk function 
used for control design and 
implementation (NOT used 
when evaluating results)
• Disk failure risk as function of 
core speed
• Blade failure risk as function of 
core speed and single turbine 
temperature
• Allowable elevated risk (10-3) 
manifested as:
– Core speed limit for disk failure
– Speed-temperature boundary 
for blade failure
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Overthrust: Implementation
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• Core speed and turbine temperature regulators used to 
maintain engine operating point on risk boundary 
• Overthrust activation: PLA mapping switches from idle-
to-max to idle-to-overthrust
Baseline
Overthrust
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Overthrust: Results
• Tested at 180 operating points (0 to 
4000 feet, Mach 0 to 0.3, standard to 
+40°R ambient temp, new to full 
deterioration)
• Maximum power setting: baseline vs. 
overthrust
• Nc-T48 reduced-order risk boundary 
(LPT inlet temperature)
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Faster Response: Risk Function
• Statistical stability assessment (SAE 
AIR1419 Rev. A, 1999)
• Risk of stall modeled as normal 
distribution
– Stall margin reported by simulation equals 
mean
– Root-sum-square of random effects equals 3 
standard deviations
• Stall probability of 10-3 corresponds to 
~2.3% stall margin
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Destabilizing Effects Non-random Random
Operating Line Inlet Distortion 0.7% -
PLA Transient 6.0% -
Fuel Control Tolerance - ±1.15%
Engine-to-Engine Variation - ±1.25%
Surge Line Reynolds Number 0.36% -
Inlet Distortion 7.5% -
Engine-to-Engine Variation - ±1.35%
Total 14.56% 2.17%
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Faster Response: Implementation
21
• Shifting acceleration schedule allows for faster dynamic response with lower 
minimum stall margin
• Iterative search conducted at 60 operating points (0 to 4000 feet, Mach 0 to 0.2, 
standard to +40°R ambient temperature, new to full deterioration) to determine offset 
values
• Implementation: 4-D interpolation on operating conditions to determine offset value
 Csank et al., “The Effect of Modified Control Limits on the Performance of a Generic Commercial 
Aircraft Engine,” 47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, 2011.
 May et al., “Improving Engine Responsiveness during Approach through High Speed Idle Control,” 
47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, 2011.
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Faster Response: Results
• Tested at 540 
operating points (within 
interpolation range)
• PLA from flight idle to 
maximum in 0.1 
seconds
• Rise time: time to 
traverse 10% to 90% of 
difference between 
initial and final thrust 
levels
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Flight Simulator
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Transport 
Aircraft
Spare
X-Plane
(TCM & C-
MAPSS40K
Master_PC1
Visuals_PC2
• Full cockpit with 
standard pilot/copilot 
controls and 
instrumentation
• PC 1: X-Plane
• PC 2: Displays
• PC 3: Everything else
– Models and control 
systems for aircraft and 
engines 
(TCM + C-MAPSS40k)
– Flight path predictor
– MPARS flight/propulsion 
control override algorithms
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Flight Simulator
24
